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Confirming The Constitutional Right of
Meaningful Access to the Courts in Non-Criminal
Cases in Washington State
James A. Bamberger1
[T]he right to access to the courts is fundamental to our system of justice.
Indeed, it is the right “conservative of all other rights”. . . . [M]eaningful
access requires representation. Where rights and responsibilities are
adjudicated in the absence of representation, the results are often unjust. If
representation is absent because of a litigant’s poverty, then likely so is
justice, and for the same reason.2

I. JUSTICE IS WANTING
Carol is a single mom who earns her living as a teacher’s aide. She has a
twelve-year-old daughter, Elsie, who has Down Syndrome. Carol’s
neighbors have been complaining about Elsie, saying that she “acts out” and
is disruptive of other tenants in the apartment complex. After receiving a
number of complaints about Elsie, Carol’s landlord advises her that she and
Elsie will have to move. When Carol explaines that they have nowhere else
to go and that much of Elsie’s conduct is due to her developmental
disability, her landlord tells her that he has no choice but to take legal steps
to evict her. Apologizing, he hands her a summons and complaint for
unlawful detainer. The court papers say that Carol is to appear before the
Superior Court in a week and prove why she should not be evicted.
If Carol and Elsie are evicted, they will be homeless. Frightened, she
calls the CLEAR legal hotline and asks for an attorney.3 She is told that the
legal aid program that serves her community is overwhelmed and has closed
intake. She is referred to her local pro bono program. Upon contacting that
program, she is told that they, too, are overwhelmed, and no pro bono
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attorney is available to take her case. She will have to defend the eviction
alone.
Carol shows up at the courthouse on the date and time of the hearing.
Presiding Judge A. Fair Law calls her case. The landlord’s attorney submits
numerous declarations from tenants documenting the allegedly disruptive
nature of Elsie’s conduct. No witnesses are called. Carol pleads with Judge
Law, telling him she has no place to move and that the claims regarding
Elsie’s conduct are blown out of proportion. She tells him that she tried to
get a lawyer to help her, but was unsuccessful. She asks Judge Law to
appoint an attorney to help her defend and preserve her housing. Judge
Law says that he cannot appoint a lawyer for her, because she has not been
charged with a crime. He then asks whether she has any witnesses or other
evidence to offer. She says she has none. Apologizing, the judge tells
Carol that he has no choice but to issue an order granting the landlord’s
request for a writ of restitution, and that she will have to be out of the
apartment within ten days. Looking down while signing the order, Judge
Law calls the next case.
The administration of American justice is not impartial, the rich
and poor do not stand on an equality before the law, the traditional
method of providing justice has operated to close the doors of the
courts to the poor, and has caused a gross denial of justice in all
parts of the country to millions of persons. . . . There is something
tragic in the fact that a plan and method of administering justice,
honestly designed to make efficient and certain that litigation on
which at last all rights depend, should result in rearing insuperable
obstacles in the path of those who most need protection, so that
litigation becomes impossible, rights are lost and wrongs go
unredressed.4
A week ago, Thomás flew into a rage and beat his wife, Anna, in front of
their two young children. It was not the first time that Thomás had done
this; he has been abusing Anna for years. But things were different this
time. The abuse frightened nine-year-old Luís so badly, that he ran into the
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back room and called 911. The police arrived, subdued Thomás, and took
him away. Anna was taken by ambulance to the hospital where she was
treated for a multiple injuries.
Thomás was arraigned on charges of second degree assault. Indigent and
unable to pay for an attorney, he was appointed a public defender to
represent him. A no-contact order was entered in accordance with the
Revised Code of Washington 10.99.040, and Thomás was released pending
trial.
Resolved to break free from the abusive relationship and protect her
children, Anna decided to seek a divorce from Thomás. She talked to an
attorney who required a $5,000 retainer. Not having any money, she sought
help from her local pro bono program. The issues of domestic violence
added complexity to the case. It was also likely that Thomás would contest
Anna’s request the children be placed primarily with her, because she
would ask the court to restrict his contact with them. No local attorney was
willing or able to take her case on a pro bono basis. She was encouraged to
talk with the local courthouse facilitator, who could show her the forms
necessary to file the case on her own. Frustrated, Anna cried out, “he beats
me and he gets a lawyer. I get beaten and need protection and I get nothing.
Where is justice?!”
The law permits every [person] to try [her] own case, but ‘the lay
vision of every man his own lawyer has been shown by all
experience to be an illusion.’ It is a virtual impossibility for a
[person] to conduct even the simplest sort of a case under the
existing rules of procedure, and this fact robs the in forma pauperis
proceeding of much of its value to the poor unless supplemented
by the providing of counsel. . . . We can end the existing denial of
justice to the poor if we can secure an administration of justice
which shall be accessible to every person no matter how humble,
and which shall be adjusted so carefully to the needs of the present
day world that it cannot be dislocated, or the evenness of its
operation be disturbed, by the fact of poverty.5
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Carol and Anna are among the thousands of Washington state residents
who need the protection of the civil court system. They do not have a
chance to realize justice in a matter that is of the utmost importance to them
and their families because they are poor and unable to obtain attorney
assistance. Carol and Anna are powerless to assert and enforce their legal
rights without legal representation. The court system cannot deliver justice
in their cases because justice is grounded in legal formality and constructed
on procedural and substantive legal frameworks that presume the
availability of attorney representation. For Carol and Anna, the civil court
system is functionally inaccessible and irrelevant.
In its worst
characterization, it is an instrument of institutionalized oppression.
Nearly a century ago, a young Chicago attorney named Reginald Heber
Smith chronicled the failures of our system of administering justice in his
treatise, Justice and the Poor.6 With amazing clarity and clairvoyance,
Smith documented deep and systemic failures of the justice system, and
predicted that the system would become increasingly irrelevant and
unresponsive to the needs of the poor unless direct action was invoked.
Central to Smith’s indictment of the American justice system was its
failure to provide adequate and effective legal representation to the millions
of poor people who cannot afford counsel to assert, enforce, and defend
important personal rights. He explained that:
[T]he substantive law, however fair and equitable itself, is
impotent to provide the necessary safeguards unless the
administration of justice, which alone gives effect and force to
substantive law, is in the highest sense impartial. It must be
possible for the humblest to invoke the protection of the law,
through proper proceedings in the courts, for any invasion of rights
by whomsoever attempted, or freedom and equality vanish into
nothingness.7
Given the unique nature of the law and complexity of judicial
proceedings, Smith asserted that a comprehensive system was needed to
ensure representation for those whose rights were the subject of
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adjudication and who, because of their poverty, could not secure essential
legal assistance.
In the years since, the crisis painstakingly documented by Smith has
deepened.8 Poor litigants like Carol and Anna, who face the prospect of
extraordinary personal loss (housing for Carol, and personal and family
safety and security for Anna) cannot meaningfully defend or enforce their
substantive legal rights in the courts of this state. They stand helpless, as
the machinery of justice grinds them down to nothing. It is profoundly
ironic that, on the one hand, a poor person facing the prospect of spending
but a single night secure in the county jail is entitled to the assistance of
counsel at public expense while, on the other hand, those faced with the
imminent loss of housing through eviction or foreclosure and the
consequent insecurity of homelessness, those who must contend with
immediate threats to their personal and family safety, or those who cannot
meet the basic needs of their families because they have been denied
essential governmental subsistence benefits are left to navigate the court
system on their own.
Both nationally and in Washington State, judges preside over a system
that continues to lose face with the public in large measure because it
systematically denies meaningful access to those who need its protection
the most—the poor, the vulnerable, the victimized, and the socially or
culturally disenfranchised. Efforts to assert a right to counsel as an incident
to constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection have been
rebuffed,9 and the poor are left to rely on a grossly under-funded network of
legal aid programs, pro bono programs, and an ever expanding array of selfhelp pamphlets and web-sites.
The failures of the system Smith painstakingly documented persist. The
result is a continuing erosion of the citizenry’s perception of the integrity of
our court system and its capacity to disseminate fair and impartial justice.10
If democracy is to remain relevant, the judicial system must be restored to a
position of respect. This can only be achieved if those who need the
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protection of that system can secure timely and meaningful access—and to
do this, they will need legal counsel.
The purpose of this article is to explore the potential sources of a state
constitutional right of meaningful access to the civil court system in
Washington State,11 to explore the degree (if any) to which such a right
manifests itself in the requirement that counsel be appointed at public
expense in certain non-criminal cases, and, to the extent that such a
requirement exists, offer an analytical framework to help judges determine
when and under what circumstances appointment of counsel is
constitutionally mandated.
This article concludes that, under Washington’s constitution, individuals
have a fundamental right of access to the courts, that the judicial branch has
a corresponding constitutional obligation to facilitate that right, and that the
intersection of this right and duty must manifest itself in a rebuttable
presumption in favor of a right to counsel at public expense in non-criminal
cases.
The analysis and theories developed in this article are grounded in state
constitutional law. They do not flow from traditional federal constitutional
due process considerations,12 nor are they grounded in considerations or
jurisprudence relevant to determining when, and under what circumstances
indigent criminal defendants are entitled to appointed counsel under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or the parallel
Washington State Constitutional provision, Article I, Sec. 22. In contrast to
such analyses, this discussion of the right to counsel in non-criminal cases
expounds on ideas of an access-based right which have been the subject of
increasing conversation within the state and national equal justice
communities.13
The balance of this article will more fully explore the crisis in civil access
to justice. It also explores historical antecedents of the individual’s right of
access to the courts within the context of our constitutional and natural
rights legal traditions, and the state’s corresponding duty to facilitate that
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right. The article reviews Washington State’s constitutional framework and
jurisprudential history relating to these considerations, finding a somewhat
scattered and substantially undeveloped analytical framework for
considering when and how the right of access should be facilitated. The
article proposes a more logical framework for both the enforcement and
practical administration of this right within the context of both the open
courts and within the privileges and immunities provisions of the
Washington Constitution. Finally, the article explores the substantial
parallels between the right of meaningful access to the courts within the
Washington State constitutional context and within emerging international
jurisprudential norms and requirements.

II. THE PROBLEM: WASHINGTON STATE’S COURT SYSTEM IS
FUNCTIONALLY INACCESSIBLE TO LOW-INCOME PEOPLE WITH
CIVIL LEGAL PROBLEMS
Washington establishes and maintains courts to administer justice and
provide a forum for the assertion, protection, and defense of constitutional,
statutory, contractual, and common law rights and responsibilities.14 As
designed, courts serve as truth-finding, conflict resolution forums. In the
tradition of the Anglo-American experience, courts are designed to achieve
resolution of conflicts through competition of opposing factual and legal
arguments.
Given the court’s purpose, design, and operation, certain core
competencies are central to any litigant’s ability to effectively assert or
defend important legal rights and claims in the Washington State trial and
appellate court system. These include
• knowledge and understanding of the relevant law (constitutional,
statutory, regulatory, case, and common law—including applicable
precedent relevant to the matters that are implicated in the particular
legal proceeding);
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•

knowledge and understanding of the jurisdiction and rules of practice
and procedure in the court in which the proceeding is pending;
• capacity to develop and effectively present evidence to the court,
both in support of the individual’s position and to rebut or negate
evidence offered by the opposing party;
• some understanding of legal reasoning and the process of making a
legal argument; and
• ability to provide informed and objective judgment in service of the
client’s objectives.
Lawyers have been trained in these competencies. Lay people have not.
So central are these competencies to the capacity of the courts to perform
their proper functions that persons untrained in these competencies may not
appear before the courts except in a self-representational or pro se
capacity.15
This is not surprising. The law involves a special language with many
dialects that must be mastered in order for one to be in a position to
effectively navigate the judicial system. Legal proceedings are foreign and
confusing to lay people who are untrained in the law and legal practice. It
follows that those who are untrained in the substance and language of the
law and legal practice cannot reasonably expect to successfully assert,
enforce, or defend their legal rights in the courts of this state.16 This truth
echoes in Washington Supreme Court Justice Richard Sanders’ observation
that “legal representation [is such] a practical necessity that those
knowledgeable in the law would have to admit that the man who represents
himself has a fool for a client.”17
The Civil Legal Needs Study recently published by the Washington
Supreme Court’s Task Force of Civil Equal Justice Funding confirms that
legal representation is the key to achieving effective outcomes to civil legal
problems.18 The study found that while nearly two-thirds of low-income
respondents who were able to secure legal assistance were satisfied with the
justice experience and the resulting outcome of their legal problems
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(regardless of whether they substantively achieved what they had hoped to
at the outset of their case), 75 percent of those without legal representation
experienced outcomes that were inconsistent with their expectations.19
The Civil Legal Needs Study documents the depth of the gap between the
numbers of low-income people needing legal assistance in connection with
a civil legal problem and those who are able to secure that assistance.
Every year more than 80 percent of all low-income households experience
at least one civil legal problem for which legal assistance is indicated.20 Of
these households, nearly nine out of ten face the problem without legal help
of any kind.21 Statistical and anecdotal information confirms that a growing
number of civil litigants are unrepresented by legal counsel on matters that
implicate many of the most personal rights and interests—personal and
family safety, dissolution, child residential placement, child support,
eviction defense, defense against housing foreclosures, protection against
abusive consumer practices, and predatory lending schemes, just to name a
few.
The Civil Legal Needs Study also confirms that many low-income people
who have claims that should be brought to the judicial system cannot do so
because they are unable to secure legal assistance.22 Examples include
housing and employment discrimination problems, problems arising from
the administration of governmental, educational, municipal services and
benefits, and problems involving the rights of disabled people to appropriate
accommodations.23
The chronic inability to obtain legal representation on matters that
present themselves in the courts of this state (or, if counsel were available,
would likely be presented) effectively denies justice to thousands of lowincome residents in Washington every year. Conversely, it converts the
court system of this state—an enterprise established and maintained by the
state for the purpose of ensuring the fair and impartial administration of
justice—into a captive enterprise that enables those who, through no special
merit other than they can afford to retain necessary legal assistance, are able
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to secure a decided advantage in the presentation of their claims and
defenses against the unschooled and unrepresented lay litigant.

III. ACCESS TO THE COURT SYSTEM: A FUNDAMENTAL AND
ENFORCEABLE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT
Modern Anglo-American legal systems are grounded in seventeenth and
eighteenth century concepts of natural law and individual rights theory. In
essence, these theories start from the presumption that all individuals are
blessed with full rights and liberties, and that they are free to exercise and
enjoy them as they please. Free individuals may elect to live in a
community in order to gain certain advantages not otherwise available to
them. In the course of organizing the communities within which they live,
and to establish general norms of conduct applicable to all, such individuals
will cede a portion of their natural rights and liberties to the community
itself. On this point, the English legal commentator William Blackstone
noted:
[Natural law sums up these rights in the appellation] “natural
liberty of mankind.” This natural liberty consists properly in the
power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control,
unless by the law of nature. . . . But every man, when he enters into
society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so
valuable a purchase; and, in consideration of receiving the
advantages of mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to
those laws, which the community has thought proper to establish.24
Natural law theory recognizes three categories of “absolute rights”: the
rights to (1) personal security, (2) personal liberty, and (3) private
property.25 These rights have been recognized as either being natural in
origin, intrinsic to the individual, or granted by society in exchange for the
rights and benefits of society itself—including the right to protection of
such rights. In one characterization or another, these core or absolute rights
have been articulated and rearticulated in every statement of individual
rights and freedoms from the Magna Carta to the Declaration of
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Independence, to the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, and to
more recent statements of the inherent rights of individuals.26 In the AngloAmerican experience, protection of these absolute rights has served as the
expressed raison d’etre of constitutional government. Blackstone explained
it this way: “[T]he first and primary end of human laws is to maintain and
regulate [the] absolute rights of individuals . . . the principal view of human
laws is, or ought always to be, to explain, protect, and enforce such rights as
are absolute . . . ”27
The Washington State Constitution is grounded in a natural law
approach to the relationship between the individual and government.
Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 1, declares that “All political power
is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just powers from the
consent of the governed, and are established to protect and maintain
individual rights.”28
While natural law theory recognized three areas of “absolute rights,” the
maintenance and protection of which is the “first and primary end of human
laws,” it was also understood that such rights are meaningless if there is no
means for their enforcement. Consequently, the Anglo-American tradition
recognized a class of subordinate rights, the primary purpose of which is to
enable the individual to protect and enforce his or her primary or absolute
rights. Among these subordinate rights is the right to seek and secure relief
in the courts. As Blackstone explained in his Commentaries:
A third subordinate right of every Englishman is that of applying
to the courts of justice for redress of injuries. Since the law is in
England the supreme arbiter of every man’s life, liberty, and
property, courts of justice must at all times be open to the subject,
and the law be duly administered therein. The emphatical words of
Magna Carta, spoken in the person of the king, who in judgment
of law (says sir Edward Coke) is ever present and repeating them
in all his courts, are these; “nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut
differemus rectum vel justitiam: [To no man will we sell, or deny,
or delay, right or justice] and therefore every subject,” continues
the same learned author, “for injury done to him in bonis, in terris,
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vel persona, by any other subject, be he ecclesiastical or temporal
without any exception, may take his remedy by the course of the
law, and have justice and right for the injury done to him, freely
without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without
delay.”29
This right of access is fundamental and has been affirmed and reaffirmed
throughout the course of the nation’s and Washington State’s history. Chief
Justice John Marshall observed in the landmark case of Marbury v.
Madison that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that
protection.”30 A century later, the Supreme Court declared that “[t]he right
to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force. In an organized
society it is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies at the
foundation of orderly government. It is one of the highest and most
essential privileges of citizenship.”31 Alternatively, Reginald Heber Smith
characterized it as follows:
Not only was the right to freedom and equality of justice set apart
with those other cardinal rights of liberty and of conscience which
were deemed sacred and inalienable, but it was made most
important of all because on it all the other rights, even the rights to
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, were made to depend. In
a word, it became the cornerstone of the Republic.32
These pronouncements demonstrate that the American tradition
carries forward both the substance and rationale of the natural right of
access to the courts described by Blackstone.33 While the AngloAmerican legal tradition clearly recognizes a fundamental individual
right of access to the courts, the following subordinate questions arise.
A. What is the Scope of the Right?
In its simplest characterization, it is a right of access to the courts
established by the people through their government for the fair and proper
administration of justice. In Washington State constitutional parlance, it
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means that “[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly and without
unnecessary delay.”34 This language descends directly from Blackstone. It
plainly means that the justice available to citizens through the courts of the
state must be administered openly and that it must be equally available to
all.
The essential purpose of judicial administration is to ensure the “fair and
proper administration of justice.”35 In the context of court proceedings, this
purpose is discharged by ensuring that justice is done in those cases and
controversies that are presented to the court. It follows, a fortiori, that
access for the sake of access, without the corresponding ability to
meaningfully participate in the system to the end that justice is capable of
being done is the antithesis of the constitutional promise and its underlying
historical rationale.
For example, no one would argue that there would be access to the courts
in the sense contemplated by the Anglo-American tradition were the
courthouse doors physically open to all, but the law itself (i.e., the statutes,
cases, court rules, etc.) is made available only to those who could pay a fee
or those who owned property in the jurisdiction.36 All would agree that
institutionalizing a system that limits access to applicable law and
procedure to a select few would effectively preclude everyone else’s ability
to use the court for the purpose for which it has been established—to assert,
enforce, and defend important rights.37 Thus, it is manifest that access (i.e.,
the ability to walk into the courthouse) simply for the sake of access cannot
be the standard.
Our court system is the central mechanism for the orderly
resolution of disputes that arise between citizens and between
citizens and the government. Moreover, it is manifest that there is
a direct relation between access to the courts and the exertion of
power within the system relative to the evaluation and resolution of
citizens’ grievances. Failure to provide equal access to the courts .
. . is fraught with the dangers of alienating our citizenry from the
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system and encouraging self-help with concomitant breaches of the
peace and likely overtones of violence.38
To vindicate the essential purpose of the right of access to the courts, the
constitutional standard must be a right of “meaningful access.”39
“Meaningful access” can be defined as the capacity to appear and
effectively participate in proceedings properly presented to the court in a
manner that will allow the court to carry out its adjudicative function to the
end that justice can be done.40
B. Where is the Right of Meaningful Access Recognized Within the
Washington State Constitution?
There are two sources of a right of meaningful access to the courts in
non-criminal cases in Washington State’s Constitution. The first is
expressed, the second is implied. Like more than forty other states,41
Washington’s Constitution Article I, Sec. 10 includes a provision directing
that “[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without
unnecessary delay.”42 Simple and elegant, this provision incorporates the
natural law rights of access understood to be necessary to the fair and
proper ordering of society and the resolution of disputes involving the rights
of citizens and their relations with the government.43 It confirms and
renders enforceable the fundamental right of “meaningful access” to the
courts in cases where significant interests are implicated and where the
court is the forum within which such rights are adjudicated.44
In addition to the expressed right of access to the courts set out in
Washington Constitution Article I, Sec.10, the right of all citizens to have
equal access to the machinery of justice, such that the courts of the state
may fairly perform the constitutional function, is implied in the privileges
and immunities clause of the state constitution, Washington Constitution
Article I, Sec. 22. This section prohibits the state from maintaining a civil
court system that grants a decided advantage to, and unmerited privilege of
access in favor, of those who can afford to secure the assistance of persons
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with the professional competencies necessary to enable to them to
meaningfully assert and defend their legal interests within the judicial
tribunal at the expense of those who cannot. This source of the right and its
practical implications are discussed more fully below in section V.
C. What is the Rationale and Constitutional Significance of this Right?
The right of meaningful access serves two distinct but complementary
constitutional objectives. First, it enables the citizenry to effectively assert,
enforce, and defend personal rights, liberties, and prerogatives. In so doing,
it operates to implement the natural law contract between the citizenry and
the state.45 Second, and equally important, the right ensures the proper
functioning of the judicial branch to the end that it is capable of fairly and
impartially resolving disputes46 between citizens and between citizens and
their government,47 such that “justice is done in the cases that come before
the court.”48 From this perspective, the right of “meaningful access”
ensures that the judicial branch is perceived to be legitimate in the eyes of
the public (as opposed to being perceived as the captive forum operated for
the exclusive benefit of those with means to secure legal representation).
At common law, the right of access to the justice system was
fundamental and deemed necessary to the ability of citizens to assert,
enforce, defend, and protect absolute rights.49
Unfortunately, the
Washington Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence is less than
cogent and hardly consistent when it comes to defining, characterizing, and
identifying the source of a fundamental right of access to the court system.
At one point the court firmly declared such a right existed and grounded it
in Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 4, and the equal protection
guarantees read into Article I, Sec. 12.50 A year later, it reaffirmed the
existence of the right, but concluded that it could not be grounded in either
of the provisions relied upon in Carter I.51 The court in Carter then
declared that there is no fundamental right of access to the courts,52 only to
retreat from this novel observation a year later by acknowledging the
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existence of such a right and by holding that the right includes a litigant’s
ability to engage in pretrial discovery.53 Amazingly, given the state of
constitutional development over more than a century, no case has expressly
considered the obvious claim that the individual right of access to the courts
arises under the most logical of provisions—Article I, Sec. 10.
Nevertheless, and despite the Washington Supreme Court’s less than
distinguished analysis over the years, the origins and purpose of the right of
access to the courts along with its express embodiment in Washington’s
constitution confirms its fundamental significance to the relationship
between the citizens of the state and their government. As a right
conservative of all other substantive rights, it is essential to the ordered
operation of society and the preservation of individual liberty.54
D. Is the Right of Meaningful Access Individually Enforceable?
Inherent in the natural rights of the individual citizen, and to the degree
that it is essential to the assertion, defense, and enforcement of other
important rights and prerogatives, the right of “meaningful access” to the
courts of the state must be understood to be held by the individual and
enforceable against the state. If there is any ambiguity on this point, some
additional constitutional provisions make this clear.
First, both the open courts provision and the privileges and immunities
clauses were written into the first article of the state constitution—that
which is a declaration of the rights of individual citizens and the
corresponding limitations on the powers of the government that was being
constituted in the subsequent articles. Thus, to the extent that rights and
prohibitions are expressed in Article I, the reference is to the rights of
individuals and prohibitions against the state that interfere with the free
exercise of these rights.
Second, Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 29 declares that “[t]he
provisions of this Constitution are mandatory, unless by express words they
are declared to be otherwise.”55 To the extent that Washington Constitution
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Article I, Sec. 10 confirms the rights of citizens to meaningful access to the
courts of the state, it also establishes a corresponding mandatory duty on the
state—and, in particular, the state judiciary—to ensure that the courts are
open, accessible, and that justice is freely administered without delay.
Similarly, to the extent that Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 12
prohibits the granting of special access to the courts for those able to afford
the professional legal assistance required to effectively participate in these
tribunals, the provision also constitutionally empowers those who are
effectively denied meaningful access the right to demand the same.
Finally, Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 32 directs that a
“frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to security of
individual right.”56 Added at the last minute (and adapted from the
Wisconsin, Illinois, and New Hampshire Constitutions),57 this provision is
the vehicle through which the framers intended that natural law concepts
continue to guide state constitutional interpretation. In this context, it is the
vehicle through which the Anglo-American understandings of the purpose,
rationale, and enforceability of the right of access must be read into
Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 10.58

IV. INDEPENDENT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS: A
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF A RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
NON-CRIMINAL CASES IS NECESSARY TO EFFECTUATE THE
INDIVIDUAL RIGHT OF MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO THE COURTS59
In our adversarial system of justice the truth is determined by the neutral
judge, magistrate, or jury. The adversarial system is based on the idea that
justice can be achieved only if the parties to a legal dispute are able to
adduce their evidence and test their opponent’s evidence under conditions
of reasonable equality. The system is constructed on the premise that the
assistance of counsel is necessary in order for an individual to meaningfully
participate in the civil courts of this state. This notion is reflected in the
myriad rules and procedures applicable to civil practice in the courts, the
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range of competencies required of those who practice in the civil courts, and
the corresponding limitations on non-lawyer representation. The failure to
provide legal counsel to indigent unrepresented litigants fundamentally
prejudices their right of “meaningful access” to the courts in matters in
which they are (or should be) parties. It also compromises the ability of the
court to perform its essential constitutional function—to receive and
objectively consider all the relevant facts and apply the applicable law in the
matters before it to the end that justice is done.60
There being no express reference of a right to counsel in non-criminal
cases in Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 10 (or any other
provision),61 this article does not argue in favor of a universal right to
counsel for indigents in all non-criminal cases.62 On the other hand, and in
light of the central role that attorneys play in enabling the courts to perform
their constitutional functions and to effectuate the individual right of
“meaningful access” to the courts (embodied in Washington Constitution
Article I, Sec. 10), there must be a substantially expanded understanding of
the constitutional right and the corresponding duty of the courts to provide
counsel to indigent litigants in non-criminal cases at public expense.
The Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 10 contemplates
“meaningful access” as, “the capacity to appear and effectively participate
in proceedings properly presented to the court in a manner that will allow
the court to carry out its adjudicative function to the end that justice can be
done.” This definition commands two complementary areas of inquiry.
The first focuses on the right and capacity of the individual to participate;
the second focuses on the capacity of the tribunal to perform its
constitutional function. Consequently, in determining when, under what
standard, and in what contexts counsel should be appointed at public
expense to indigent litigants in non-criminal cases, the analysis must look to
the intersecting constitutional obligations of the court to (a) respect and
operationalize the individual’s Article I, Sec. 10 right of access and (b)
ensure “the fair and impartial administration of justice [to the end] that
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justice is done in the cases that come before [it],”63 and that it credibly
serves as “the central mechanism for the orderly resolution of disputes that
arise between citizens and between citizens and the government.”64
Given the nature of the court system and the competencies required to
participate effectively therein, the aforementioned constitutional
considerations logically dictate the creation of a rebuttable presumption in
favor of the appointment of counsel at public expense for indigent litigants
in non-criminal cases. Under this presumption, counsel should be
appointed at public expense to unrepresented indigent persons who are
forced to respond to a civil proceeding, or who must initiate civil
proceedings in the courts of this state to assert and enforce their legal rights.
The court may decline to appoint counsel only if it determines, on the basis
of considerations relevant to the circumstances of the case, that (a) the
unrepresented litigant can fairly and ably present and defend his or her case
on relatively equal footing with the opposing side, and (b) the court can
effectively discharge its duty to ensure that justice can be done in the matter
before it. These are independent inquiries. The first flows from the
individual’s right of “meaningful access;” the second flows from the
Washington Constitution Article IV duty of the court to ensure the fair and
impartial administration of justice. The duty to appoint counsel can only be
avoided if the court finds that both conditions are met.
The presumption will readily be overcome within some contexts. An
obvious example are cases that arise in small claims court, a judicial forum
established by the Washington State Legislature to resolve cases involving
relatively small (less than $4,000) amounts.65 Because the rules of the court
are simple, forms are readily available, evidentiary issues are not complex,
and the trial judge has been granted substantial latitude to deviate from the
traditional neutral magistrate function to more of an inquisitor in service of
finding a “right, just, and equitable” resolution of the controversy, the
Legislature has concluded that the involvement of attorneys is neither
necessary nor desirable in this forum.66 As conceived and operated within
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the context of the limited jurisdiction of the forum and the issues presented
therein, justice can generally be achieved without the assistance of counsel.
Outside the small claims context, matters become more complex. The
key, then, is to develop a set of relevant criteria and a practical approach to
their operation. These criteria must be grounded in the realities of judicial
practice and procedure and must be applied in a manner that facilitates the
low-income67 individual’s right of “meaningful access” and ensures
effective discharge of the constitutional duty of the court to ensure the fair
and proper administration of justice. They must also be applied in ways
that recognize and respect the scarcity of public resources and avoid the
expenditure of public funds for counsel in matters in which the private
market should allow the individual to secure legal representation.
A non-exclusive list of relevant considerations should, at a minimum,
include: (1) the jurisdiction and function of the court within which the case
appears (or should appear) and the rules of practice, procedure, discovery,
and evidence applicable to the proceeding; (2) the capacity of the litigant to
develop and present evidence and legal arguments relevant to her claim and
to respond to evidence and legal arguments presented by the other side; (3)
complexity of the applicable law; (4) the practical consequences (in terms
of outcomes realized) likely to be experienced by the unrepresented litigant
as a result of not being represented by counsel in the proceeding (i.e., would
the appointment of legal counsel likely make a significant difference in the
outcome of the case?); (5) the availability of counsel on a pro bono or
contingency fee basis; and (6) the importance of the issues presented from
the perspective of the unrepresented litigant.
In contrast to the first five considerations, the sixth involves a subjective
inquiry into the importance of the matter from the perspective of the
individual litigant. The analysis is driven by the following question: If the
unrepresented litigant had the resources, would she find the matter
sufficiently important to purchase the services of an attorney? To avoid its
application in ways that render absurd results, the question must be used as
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a guide to understanding when counsel should be appointed. Because
litigation can be motivated by a wide range of considerations, there are
some who may make the subjective determination that they would “pay
what it takes” to pursue a cause when a more “objective” person under
similar circumstances might suggest that the benefits to be realized were not
worth the costs involved. While judges must exercise prudence and
discretion in weighing this consideration, the analysis should mechanically
operate in favor of the appointment of counsel in those cases where the
opposing party has found the matter to be of sufficient importance to
warrant his or her retention of counsel.
Application of these six factors starts from the presumption that counsel
is to be appointed. The presumption may be overcome only if the court
makes the following specific findings of fact:
a) The nature of the case is such that, under the market conditions
prevailing in the jurisdiction, a private attorney would normally
be willing to take the matter on a contingency fee basis;68 or
b) The court has identified a pro bono attorney able and willing to
represent the litigant in the matter before the court;69 or
c) The matter is neither factually nor legally complex and the
litigant has the resources, education, experience, substantive
knowledge, and intellectual capacity to effectively present,
promote, and defend her legal interests; and
d) In the absence of attorney representation, it can be expected that
the relevant facts will be adduced and the appropriate legal
arguments on both sides will be presented such that the court
can perform its constitutional duty to ensure that justice is done.
So, how will this analysis work in the context of cases typical of those
experienced by low-income people in Washington State? A couple of
examples are helpful.
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Example 1:
This example involves the case of a family in conflict. The parents have
separated; there are claims of domestic violence; domestic violence
protection orders have previously been issued; there are young children at
issue who allegedly have witnessed the violence and abuse; the father is
working and makes a living wage; the mother and children have been
forced to leave the home and currently reside in a community-based shelter;
the mother is not working and has no income. The father has retained an
attorney and initiated divorce proceedings. He seeks primary residential
placement of the children, limitations on contact between the children and
their mother, child support, and award of the family home. Both parents
have high school educations. The mother has been served with an ex parte
temporary restraining order and an order to show cause why the court
should not enter a further order awarding temporary residential placement
of the children with the father, limiting her access to the children, and
directing that she stay away from the family home. The mother cannot
afford legal counsel. She has filed a declaration stating that she has been
unsuccessful in her effort to secure assistance from both the local legal aid
program (intake is closed) and the pro bono program. An analysis of the
relevant considerations follows:
1. Jurisdiction and function of the court within which the case
appears (or should appear) and the rules of practice, procedure,
discovery, and evidence applicable to the proceeding.
The superior court is a constitutional court of record with original and
exclusive jurisdiction in all family law matters.70 The court has statutory
authority to entertain the father’s request and grant appropriate relief.
Practice in the superior court is governed by myriad rules (state and local),
timelines, and procedures. The judge presides in the capacity of a neutral
magistrate, with responsibility to hear, weigh, and decide the case on the
basis of the information that comes before it. The judge may not help one
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side or the other present his or her case or otherwise engage in any conduct
that manifests bias in favor of a party litigant.71
Family law practice in the superior court is governed by numerous
statutes,72 including the Civil Rules (CR’s) and the local rules applicable in
the county. Discovery rules are applicable as are the Rules of Evidence
(ER’s). While some judges grant latitude to pro se litigants, effective
development and presentation of the mother’s case requires substantial
familiarity of and a corresponding ability to comply with these rules. The
mother’s lack of knowledge and understanding of these rules places her at a
decided disadvantage. This is particularly true where, as in this instance,
the opposing party is represented by counsel learned in the rules and who
will, consistent with his duty of zealous representation, seek to use the
mother’s inability to comply with applicable rules, procedures, and
evidentiary requirements to his client’s advantage.
2. The mother’s capacity to develop and present evidence and legal
arguments relevant to her claim and respond to evidence and legal
arguments presented by the other side.
The mother is a high school graduate, untutored in family law statutes,
case law, practice, and procedure. Access to a courthouse facilitator73 or
other sources of self-help assistance74 may result in her ability to obtain
necessary forms and copies of applicable court rules.
Because the father is represented by counsel, the advantage in presenting
claims, evidence, and defenses tips decidedly in his favor. Even if the
mother, in her pro se capacity, is able to secure an order appointing a
guardian ad litem (GAL) to make an independent assessment of the needs
of the children and make recommendations regarding residential placement,
limitations, and support, she remains at a significant disadvantage when it
comes to developing her evidence, having the evidence admitted,
conducting discovery, cross-examining the father and his witnesses, crossexamining the GAL and others, defending against hostile cross-

VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 1 • 2005

405

406 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

examination, and subpoenaing and protecting the witnesses she may bring
on her behalf.75
3. Complexity of the law applicable to the dispute (statutes,
regulations, case law, etc.).
A wealth of statutes, regulations, court rules, and case law will govern the
disposition of the legal and factual issues relating to the dissolution,
including the terms of the parenting plan, whether and what restrictions or
limitations on contact between the parents and the children are indicated,
the amount of child support, the allocation of community and noncommunity property, and other matters arising from the dissolution of the
parties’ marriage.76 The mother in this case is a lay person untrained and
unschooled in the art of reading and applying case law. Even if she can
access applicable statutes and court rules, she will not know how to access,
understand the implications of, and use case law to her advantage.
4. The practical consequences (in terms of outcomes realized) likely
to be experienced by the unrepresented litigant as a result of not
being represented by counsel in the proceeding.
Resolution of this case will directly affect core rights and interests of the
mother, not the least of which will be the nature and scope of her
relationship with her children. The father has filed for dissolution and
primary residential placement. He seeks limitations on the mother’s contact
with the children and award of the family home. There is a real legal and
factual contest here. Absent the assistance of counsel, the mother will be
unable to develop and present her evidence, defend herself in the initial
temporary hearing, meet and contest the father’s proofs, and establish an
evidentiary basis for securing an award of primary residential placement
and other appropriate relief. Justice, which is otherwise unavailable in the
absence of legal counsel, would be within the mother’s reach upon
appointment of counsel.
5. The importance of the issues presented from the perspective of the
unrepresented litigant.
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The central issue involves the mother’s rights to residential placement of,
and contact with, her children. This is a profoundly personal matter that
implicates core family considerations. While not a parental rights
termination proceeding,77 the relief requested by the father would, if
granted, substantially limit the mother’s statutory rights and constitutionally
protected liberties78 to care, support, provide for, and experience the
companionship of her children. Moreover, to the extent that the father
seeks an award of child support and transfer of the family home to him, the
relief requested will also directly affect the mother’s future economic
conditions and her housing situation. Surely, if the mother had the
resources, she would retain counsel in this case.
6. The availability of counsel on a pro bono or contingency fee basis.
The mother filed a declaration affirming the unavailability of legal aid
and pro bono assistance. Contingency fees are not authorized in family law
cases.79
Absent the assistance of counsel, the proceeding is likely to be a
decidedly one-sided affair and, despite the best efforts of the trial judge, a
judicial farce. No lay person in the mother’s position could be expected to
effectively defend herself against the claims and underlying allegations that
have been made against her, and to effectively assert and enforce her legal
rights in the proceeding. Nor can the court perform its constitutional
function. The court is prohibited from developing evidence for the mother.
Yet, it is duty-bound to decide the case on the evidence properly admitted.
In this case, properly admitted evidence will most likely be limited to the
evidence presented by the father’s attorney. Justice cannot be done when
only one side of the story is told.
Applying the considerations set forth above, the presumption in favor of
the appointment of counsel cannot be rebutted in this case. Pro bono
counsel is unavailable, and the matter is not one for which a private attorney
can undertake representation on a contingency fee basis. The matter is
factually and legally complex. The mother does not have the resources,
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education, experience, substantive knowledge, and intellectual capacity to
effectively present, promote, and defend her legal interests. Finally, in the
absence of attorney representation, it cannot be expected that the relevant
facts will be adduced, and it cannot be expected that the appropriate legal
arguments on both sides will be presented such that the court can perform
its constitutional duty to ensure that justice is done.
Under the
circumstances presented here, it becomes the state’s responsibility to
provide counsel at public expense, because it established and maintains the
judicial system within which the mother’s rights are to be adjudicated.
Example 2:
A case recently reported by the Northwest Justice Project is
representative of another of the many types of cases where legal counsel is
necessary to effectuate the right of “meaningful access” guaranteed by
Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 10.80 Many low-income individuals
and families face legal problems relating to their ability to acquire or retain
permanent shelter.81 This case involves an eviction proceeding filed by a
landlord against a woman whose father had broken into her apartment and
assaulted her friend. While the father was arrested and jailed for the
criminal assault, the landlord determined that the breach of peace associated
with the assault violated the terms of the woman’s lease. Represented by an
attorney, the landlord filed an unlawful detainer proceeding. He claimed a
right to evict both on the basis of the events surrounding the assault, and
also on the basis of non-payment of rent (despite the fact that rent had been
prepaid and that the tenant actually had a credit on her account). The
individual in this case was lucky; she was able to secure the assistance of a
state-funded legal aid attorney. But many others like her are not as lucky,
and they are forced to defend themselves against similar claims without
legal help. The following analysis assumes that counsel was not available
and the indigent tenant, unable to afford private counsel, was faced with the
prospect of proceeding alone.
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1.

Jurisdiction and function of the court within which the case
appears (or should appear) and the rules of practice, procedure,
discovery, and evidence applicable to the proceeding.
The superior court has original jurisdiction in unlawful detainer
proceedings.82 Resorting to self-help is no longer sanctioned by state law.83
Therefore, the unlawful detainer procedure is the exclusive means of
involuntarily terminating a tenancy and restoring the landlord to possession.
Practice before the court is governed by a myriad of state and local rules,
timelines, and procedures. The judge presides in the capacity of a neutral
magistrate with responsibility to hear, weigh, and decide the case on the
basis of the information that comes before it. The judge may not help one
side or the other.
The unlawful detainer proceeding is a special statutory process
established to quickly address disputes regarding rights to possession of
property under lease.84 The statutory process is highly technical.85
Proceedings are subject to the Civil Rules and the Evidence Rules. In this
type of proceeding, there is a limited ability to conduct discovery, and
proceedings before the court are often quite summary. Strict time limits
apply; non-compliance can result in the summary grant of a writ of
restitution despite the defendant having good legal or factual defenses.86
Failure to timely respond, or to respond appropriately, will result in the
summary issuance of a writ of restitution, depriving the tenant of her right
to continue to live in the apartment.87 While the matter may ultimately
proceed to a trial on the merits, she will have been deprived of the single
most important aspect of her right—the right to continue to live in the
apartment. She risks not only of the loss of the motion for issuance of the
writ but, as a direct consequence of such loss the prospect of homelessness.
If the writ wrongly issues and is executed, no subsequent relief can undo the
harm that she will have experienced.
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2.

The tenant’s capacity to develop and present evidence and legal
arguments relevant to her defense and respond to evidence and
legal arguments presented by the landlord.
The tenant is unschooled in the law. There are some self-help materials
on-line to help the tenant draft and file a response. However, given the
complexity of the case and the corresponding statutory time lines involved,
it is not likely that this tenant will be able to prepare and timely file the
necessary documents to defend her tenancy.
Because the landlord is represented by counsel, he has a substantial
advantage in presenting his claim of right to possession. In contrast, the
unrepresented tenant might miss necessary deadlines, fail to properly
authenticate or submit evidence on time, or otherwise be unable to present
necessary legal and factual arguments because she is ignorant of relevant
substantive law88 and legal process as well as the special statutory process
applicable to unlawful detainer actions.
3. Complexity of the law applicable to the dispute (statutes,
regulations, case law, etc.).
In addition to the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act and the Unlawful
Detainer Act, the tenant has rights under numerous other statutes, including
state and federal fair housing statutes. Additionally, substantial case law has
developed in the area. In this case, recent amendments to the Residential
Landlord-Tenant Act provided a substantive defense to the eviction.89 In
the absence of effective legal assistance, it is unlikely that a defense based
on the tenant’s status as a victim of violence would ever be identified or
asserted.
4. The practical consequences (in terms of outcomes realized)
likely to be experienced by the unrepresented litigant as a result
of not being represented by counsel in the proceeding.
There is no question that the assistance of legal counsel would have a
material effect on the outcome of this case. The tenant had both legal and
factual defenses.90 Without legal counsel, she would in all likelihood
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neither know of nor understand the process by which she could perfect her
ability to assert these defenses. Legal assistance would be the difference
between continued residency in her apartment or homelessness.
5. The importance of the issues presented from the perspective of
the unrepresented litigant.
At issue is the tenant’s right to continued residency in the apartment
under the terms and conditions of her lease. If the landlord is successful,
the tenant faces eviction and homelessness. From the subjective perspective
of the tenant, the threat to her ability to remain in safe, secure housing is
significant. If she had the resources, she would no doubt seek the assistance
of legal counsel.
6. The availability of counsel on a pro bono or contingency fee
basis.
The facts of this case presume that legal aid services are not available.
Due to the fact that the proceeding is being limited to adjudication of the
competing claims to possession, there is no potential damages award from
which a contingency fee could reasonably be secured.
As with the previously discussed case, the circumstances of the present
case compel the appointment of counsel. No court could make the findings
necessary to overcome the constitutional presumption in favor of a right to
counsel. Pro bono counsel is not available nor is there a potential for
contingency fee representation. Undertaking the relevant inquiry, the
circumstances of the case would compel judicial findings that (a) the matter
is factually and legally complex; (b) the tenant does not have the resources,
education, experience, substantive knowledge, and intellectual capacity to
effectively present, promote, and defend her legal interests; and (c) in the
absence of attorney representation, it cannot reasonably be expected that (i)
the relevant facts will be adduced, and (ii) the appropriate legal arguments
on both sides will be presented such that the court can perform its
constitutional duty to ensure that justice is done. Consequently, in this
statutorily mandated legal proceeding, the guarantee of “meaningful access”
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embodied in Washington Constitution, Article I, Sec. 10 requires the
appointment of legal counsel to represent the indigent tenant.
The cases described above are representative of the wide range of cases
where the constitutional presumption in favor of a right to counsel should
hold. While judges in some cases may find that counsel is available on
either a pro bono or contingency fee basis, it must be anticipated that legal
counsel will have to be appointed for the substantial majority of indigent
litigants whose cases involve important personal and family interests, rights
relating to housing, enforcement of laws relating to discrimination and
protection of civil rights, access to governmental assistance, health care
(including mental health care), educational services, and other cases where
the opposing party is represented by legal counsel.

V. THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF APPOINTED COUNSEL IN NONCRIMINAL CASES PROTECTS AGAINST THE STATE
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY GRANTING UNMERITED SPECIAL RIGHTS
AND PRIVILEGES OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS IN FAVOR THOSE WHO
CAN AFFORD TO RETAIN LEGAL COUNSEL.
The right of “meaningful access” to the justice system for enforcement
and defense of important rights is an outgrowth of the Anglo-American
natural rights legal philosophy upon which our state and federal
constitutions are grounded. Originating in the promises of Article 40 of the
Magna Carta91 and affirmed by many states in their constitutions well-prior
to the ratification of the federal Constitution,92 an unfettered and meaningful
right of access to the courts of the state was understood to be essential to the
ability of the citizens to secure and defend their rights, liberties, and
property. Thus, even in the absence of a separate constitutional provision
confirming and making it individually enforceable, the right of “meaningful
access” to the courts is so central to and conservative of other personal
rights that it must be understood to be both fundamental and incidental to
the rights that flow from one’s status as a citizen of the state. This latter
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point—that free and “meaningful access” to the justice system is a right
incidental to citizenship—is central to a claim that failure to provide
counsel in those cases where counsel is necessary to secure “meaningful
access” to the court93 violates the privileges and immunities clause of
Washington State’s Constitution.94
Article I, Sec. 12 of Washington’s Constitution directs that “[n]o law
shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other
than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall
not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.”95 In the absence of a
state constitutional provision that parallels the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, this provision has historically served as the source
of state-based equal protection constitutional inquiries.96 In recent years,
and in response to a crescendo of academic encouragement97 and
jurisprudential developments in the states from which Washington’s
privileges and immunities clause was borrowed,98 the Washington Supreme
Court has determined that Article I, Sec. 12 is capable of serving as an
independent source of protection for certain individual rights and that it may
be interpreted to impose a corresponding set of limitations on state
governmental conduct.99
Grant County II involved a challenge to the statutory petition method for
municipal annexations. While upholding the statutory scheme under
challenge in the case, the Washington Supreme Court for the first time
expressly held that the special privileges and immunities prohibition
embodied in Article I, Sec. 12 was intended to offer protection distinct from
that available under traditional equal protection analysis, and that an
independent inquiry is appropriate to determine whether governmental
action affords special rights and privileges in violation of that section.100
According to the court, a violation of the prohibition against special
privileges and immunities in Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 12101
will be found if the law, or its application, confers a “privilege” to a
particular class of citizens to the exclusion of others. Thus, the inquiry
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turns to what is a “privilege” within the meaning of the state constitution.
The court defined privileges as “those fundamental rights that are incidental
to state citizenship.”102 The court quoted with approval its early
interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause in State v. Vance,103
where it held that:
The privileges and immunities therein referred to pertain alone to
those fundamental rights which belong to the citizens of the state
by reason of such citizenship. These terms, as they are used in the
constitution of the United States, secure in each state to the citizens
of all states the right to remove to and carry on business therein;
the right, by usual modes, to acquire and hold property, and to
protect and defend the same in the law; the rights to the usual
remedies to collect debts, and to enforce other personal rights; and
the right to be exempt, in property or persons, from taxes or
burdens which the property or persons of citizens of some other
state are exempt from.104
The quoted language from Vance places the right of “meaningful access”
to the courts in its proper Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 12 context
and affirms that, regardless of its source (i.e., whether originating in the
common law, as a result of “recourse to fundamental rights” or the language
of Article I, Sec. 10), such a right is a “privilege” within the meaning of that
clause. According to the court, “privileges” protected by Washington
Constitution Article I, Sec. 12 are those “fundamental rights which belong
to the citizens of the state by reason of such citizenship.” It affirms that
such rights include, but are not necessarily limited to, the right to “protect
and defend [property] in the law; the rights to the usual remedies to collect
debts, and to enforce other personal rights.”105
Thus, even independent of Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 10,
the right of “meaningful access” to the courts is a “privilege” within the
meaning of Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 12. But the inquiry
does not end here. One additional obstacle exists before it can be concluded
that the protections offered by this provision manifest in an affirmative duty

ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Meaningful Access to the Courts

on the part of the state to facilitate “meaningful access” to the courts for
those unable to secure the professional legal assistance that is essential to
their ability to effectively assert and defend their rights in the forum.
The text of Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 12 is prohibitive in its
construction. It reads “[n]o law shall be passed . . . ” The framers of the
constitution adopted this provision in part in response to concerns with the
excesses and influences that private interests had obtained through the
courting of special legislative favors.106 That the language prohibits
affirmative legislative grants of special preferences is, therefore, not
surprising. But there is little difference between affirmative grants of
special privileges, on the one hand, and passive conduct that, in the course
of performing governmental functions, effectively confers special
privileges, on the other. Moreover, there is little distinction between
legislative conduct in granting special privileges and executive or judicial
conduct that accomplishes the same result. All such conduct is repugnant to
the purposes that the framers intended to accomplish; i.e., protection against
governmental conduct that confers special, unmerited privileges and
immunities. It is also repugnant to the class of rights that it is designed to
protect, i.e., those rights that are fundamental incidents of state citizenship.
Whether active or passive, and whether legislative, executive, or judicial, all
statues, rules, and procedures that effectively operate to confer special
privileges or immunities relating to the exercise of fundamental rights
incidental to citizenship must fall within the prohibitions of Washington
Constitution Article I, Sec. 12.
Part of the problem with current privileges and immunities
jurisprudence—both in Washington and in those other states that undertake
an independent analysis—is that the cases focus on challenges to
affirmative legislative acts that grant special rights (‘undue favoritism’) or
single out classes of individuals on the basis of some distinguishing
characteristics.107 No case has considered the situation where the state
1) undertakes to perform a constitutionally mandated function;108
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2) does so in a palpably even-handed manner (i.e., does not
expressly single out specific classes of citizens for favored
treatment);
3) employs rules and procedures that, on their face, apply generally
to all without distinction; but
4) in the course of performing the constitutional function in an
even-handed manner, effectively erects insurmountable barriers
to the ability of certain classes of citizens109 to avail themselves
of the governmentally established and maintained enterprise,
and
5) as a consequence denies these same classes of persons
fundamental rights;110 while
6) exercising unmerited favoritism in providing access to the
governmental enterprise.111
Yet, this is precisely the situation that exists with Washington State’s
court system. Washington Constitution Article IV establishes the judicial
branch of state government and charges it with the fair and proper
administration of justice.112 The court system that has developed is
governed by complex substantive, evidentiary, and procedural rules which
presume the availability and effective assistance of legal counsel. These
rules apply generally to all who come before the courts. However, in doing
so, they operate to foreclose “meaningful access” to the courts for those
who are unable to secure legal counsel, while at the same time offering
special advantages to those who have the assistance of an attorney. As a
consequence, the design, structure, and operation of the court system
effectively confers unmerited special rights of access to those with the
ability to secure legal counsel while effectively denying the fundamental
right of access to those without this ability.
The key, once again, is the interrelationship between the constitutionally
mandated governmental function (establishment and maintenance of courts
for the fair and impartial administration of justice) and the fundamental
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right of “meaningful access” that all citizens have to it. Where, as here, the
right of access to a governmental enterprise (the court system) is
fundamental, Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 12 imposes upon the
government that develops and maintains that enterprise an affirmative duty
to ensure that such an enterprise is designed, operated, and maintained in a
way that enables the citizenry to realize such a right of access. Conversely,
this provision prohibits the government from creating a court system that,
on the one hand, inherently requires the assistance of legal counsel in order
for citizens to effectively assert and defend legal rights and prerogatives but,
on the other, refuses to provide such counsel where the citizen is unable to
secure it on his or her own. Such a system effectively operates to confer
special rights of access to, and enjoyment of, the justice system (which is
constitutionally mandated to be open to all) to those who can afford legal
counsel at the expense of those who cannot.
Under our constitutional form of government, the justice system is
maintained by the judicial branch.113 The legitimacy of any system of
justice is a function of its capacity to treat people equally before the law. In
the words of the Magna Carta, “[t]o no one will we sell, to no one will we
refuse, or delay, right or justice.”114 Or, as Alexander Hamilton observed in
Federalist Paper No. 78, the purpose of the judicial branch is “to secure a
steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.”115 Impartiality is
not achieved in a system which confers special privileges on one class of
participants to the decided and systemic disadvantage of another.
As the civil legal system is conceived, designed, structured, and
maintained, lawyers are essential to parties’ effective participation in most
types of proceedings hosted within that civil court system. By designing a
system that requires attorney representation to realize effective outcomes
and, at the same time, declining to appoint counsel to indigent litigants in
matters where counsel is essential to their ability to meaningfully participate
in the proceeding, the judicial branch passively fosters special rights of
access to the system. This special right of access operates as a privilege
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within the meaning of Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 12 in favor
of those who can afford legal counsel while effectively denying similar
rights to those who cannot. No affirmative statutory classification is
employed to effectuate this distinction or grant of special privilege. It
inheres in the structure and design of the system itself. Consequently, the
system operates to deny the fundamental right of access to some while
conferring unmerited special rights of access to others; in so doing, it
unconstitutionally grants special rights and privileges in violation of
Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 12.
Here, as in the analysis under Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 10,
the overarching consideration is the right of “meaningful access.” Just as
the right does not manifest itself in an absolute right to appointed counsel
for indigent litigants in all civil cases within the art. 1, sec. 10 analysis,
neither does it under the privileges and immunities analysis of Washington
Constitution Article I, Sec. 12. The rebuttable presumption outlined in
section IV above effectively ensures the appointment of counsel in those
cases where legal representation is essential to the indigent litigant’s
meaningful participation in the court proceeding while, at the same time,
protecting against the appointment of counsel in cases where it is not
constitutionally required.

VI. EMERGING INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE PROVIDES
COMPLEMENTARY GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT FOR A REBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN
NON-CRIMINAL CASES
The analytical approach to recognizing and enforcing the individual’s
right of “meaningful access” to the courts under Washington Constitution
Article I, Sec. 10 discussed above is consistent with the approach employed
by the European Court of Human Rights in interpreting a nearly identical
provision of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
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Fundamental Freedoms. Article 6-1 of the Convention reads in relevant
part:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.116
Like Washington Constitution Article I, Sec. 10,117 Article 6-1 of the
Convention does not affirmatively direct the appointment of counsel in civil
or criminal cases. It merely speaks to the right of individuals to “a fair and
public hearing.” Yet, two cases interpreting Article 6-1 make clear that,
under the proper circumstances, the provision operates to require the
appointment of counsel in a broad range of non-criminal cases.
The first such case is Airey v. Ireland. 118 Seeking relief under the right
of access to justice affirmed by Article 6, the petitioner in Airey sought
appointment of counsel to petition the High Court of Ireland for a judicial
separation from her husband. Rejecting the Government of Ireland’s
assertion that Ms. Airey’s personal circumstances (i.e., her poverty) created
the barrier to her ability to secure otherwise authorized judicial relief, the
European Court of Human Rights ruled that the appointment of counsel was
mandatory to effectuate her “right of access” secured under Article 6-1 of
the Convention. The court looked to many of the factors outlined in the
approach suggested in Section IV above, including the nature of the forum,
the nature of the proceeding, the difficulties of proof and procedure, the
nature of the petitioner’s rights at stake, and the likelihood that justice could
be realized without the effective assistance of counsel.119 The court
concluded that it is “most improbable that a person in Mrs. Airey’s position
[reference omitted] can effectively present his or her own case . . . [and that]
the possibility of appearing before a court in person [i.e., pro se] before the
High Court does not provide the applicant with an effective right of
access.”120
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Although it concluded that appointment of counsel was required under
the totality of circumstances presented in Ms. Airey’s case, the court made
clear that Ireland was not obligated to appoint counsel in all cases, and that
it was free to develop such other approaches as it might deem appropriate to
ensure that the citizens of that country have an effective right of access to
the courts. On this point, the court observed:
[W]hilst Article 6-1 guarantees to litigants an effective right of
access to the courts for the determination of their ‘civil rights and
obligations,’ it leaves to the State a free choice of the means to be
used towards this end. The institution of a legal aid scheme - which
Ireland now envisages in family law matters . . . constitutes one of
those means but there are others such as, for example, a
simplification of procedure.121
But, in the absence of alternative means, the court concluded that Ireland
was required to appoint counsel to enable Ms. Airey to secure the legal
separation to which she was entitled under the law.122
A more recent case interpreting Article 6-1 is the case of Steel and
Morris v. The United Kingdom.123 The case was a complex libel action
filed by McDonalds Corporation against two London-based individuals,
Helen Steel and David Morris, who had engaged in an active antiMcDonalds publicity effort that, among other things, linked McDonalds’
practices to global rainforest defoliation and deforestation, economic
exploitation, collusion with corrupt third world nation leaders, exploitation
of children, and inhumane slaughterhouse practices.124 McDonalds sued the
two seeking £100,000 in damages. Filed in 1990, the case involved
multiple motions, more than twenty-eight days of hearings, and a trial that
lasted 313 days. The defendants were denied counsel through the British
Office of Legal Aid and, for the most part, defended themselves without the
extended assistance of counsel.125 McDonalds prevailed at the trial and,
when the case was revised on appeal, judgments were entered in the amount
of £36,000 against Ms. Steel and £40,000 against Mr. Morris.126 After
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exhausting all domestic appeals, Steel and Morris appealed to the European
Court of Human Rights, alleging among other things that the denial of legal
assistance operated to deprive them of their rights to a fair hearing within
the meaning of Article 6-1 of the Convention.
The court evaluated the case under the criteria outlined in Airey, and
concluded that, under the circumstances presented in the case, the denial of
legal assistance to Ms. Steel and Mr. Morris violated Article 6-1.127 The
court first affirmed that the right of access to court in a democratic society
is ensured by the right to a fair trial. Citing its decision in Airey, the court
stated, “It is central to the concept of a fair trial, in civil as in criminal
proceedings, that a litigant is not denied the opportunity to present his or her
case effectively before the court and that he or she is able to enjoy equality
of arms with the opposing side.”128 Characterizing the state of the law with
respect to the right to counsel under Article 6-1 of the Convention, the
Court continued:
Article 6-1 leaves to the State a free choice of the means to be used
in guaranteeing litigants the above rights. The institution of a legal
aid scheme constitutes one of those means but there are others,
such as for example simplifying the applicable procedure.
The question whether the provision of legal aid is necessary for a fair
hearing must be determined on the basis of the particular facts and
circumstances of each case and will depend inter alia upon the importance
of what is at stake for the applicant in the proceedings, the complexity of
the relevant law and procedure and the applicant’s capacity to represent him
or herself effectively.129
The benchmark in determining whether and under what circumstances
Article 6-1 requires appointment of counsel is whether, under the totality of
the circumstances, “each side is afforded a reasonable opportunity to
present his or her case under conditions that do not place him or her at a
substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the adversary.” 130 The court identified a
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number of indicators in determining whether, under the circumstances of
any given case, counsel would be required. These included:
• whether the litigants initiated proceedings or were forced by the
conduct of others (those who sued them) to defend important
rights and prerogatives in a forum chosen by those who initiated
the action;131
• the nature of the legal rights at issue (the court observed, for
example, that a case involving family relations is presumptively
important because it not only affects the rights and relations
between the two litigants, but also has implications for any
children of the relationship);132
• whether potential financial implications may, in light of other
circumstances, so threaten personal rights of the parties as to
require the effective assistance of legal counsel (i.e., legal aid
may be required even in cases where damages are the only relief
requested);133
• the complexity of substantive law and legal procedure.134
Indicators include the number of witnesses, volume of
transcript, duration of proceedings, number of motions filed,
amount of documentary evidence required to be produced, the
existence of highly technical factual materials, the length of the
judgments entered in the case, etc.;
• the extent to which the unrepresented party is able to bring an
effective defense despite the absence of legal counsel.135
• the extent to which there is a disparity between the respective
levels of legal assistance enjoyed by the parties and the degree
to which such disparity would, under the totality of the
circumstances of the case, give rise to unfairness, despite the
best efforts of the judges who preside over the proceedings; and
• whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the lack of
access to legal counsel operates to deprive the party of the
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opportunity to present his or her case effectively before the court
and, as a consequence, contribute to an unacceptable inequality
of arms with the opposing party.136
Applying these criteria to the facts of the proceeding before it, the court
concluded that counsel should have been appointed to defend Ms. Steel and
Mr. Morris against the libel charges filed against them.137
The parallels between Article 6-1 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article I, Sec. 10 of the
Washington Constitution are manifest. The former declares that “everyone
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” The latter declares
that “[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without
unnecessary delay.” The Convention requires appointment of counsel in
cases where the unrepresented litigant would be placed at a decided
disadvantage in presenting his or her claims to the tribunal and in meeting
the proofs offered by the other side (i.e., Airey, Steel and Morris).
Grounded in similar philosophy and legal traditions, Washington
Constitution Article I, Sec. 10 must be read to require the same. The
rebuttable presumption in favor of the appointment of counsel outlined in
section IV above effectively serves this end.

VII. CONCLUSION
Washington State’s civil court system was established and is maintained
to enable citizens of the state to secure a fair, proper, and effective
resolution to their civil disputes. Washington Constitution Article I, Sec.
10 promises that the civil court system will be “open and available to all”
for the resolution of disputes “without delay.”
In practical operation, the court system is neither open nor available to
those who often need its protection the most: low-income individuals facing
civil legal problems implicating the most critical of life’s necessities such as
shelter, personal safety, personal and familial security, and governmental
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accountability. For these people, the lack of access to legal counsel
routinely deprives them of the ability to defend, assert, and enforce
“absolute” rights to individual and family security, personal liberty, and
private property. Maintenance of a judicial system that requires the
effective assistance of counsel for a fair and proper defense or assertion of
legal rights and prerogatives and then fails to provide counsel to those who
cannot afford it threatens to transform the judicial system into a province
where justice will be available only to those with resources. If this threat
remains unaddressed, the judicial system will lose the credibility necessary
to preserve its very legitimacy and, with it, the essential character of our
legal tradition so boldly carved into the parapet of the United States
Supreme Court building—Equal Justice Under Law.
Washington State’s Constitution confers a right of meaningful access to
the judicial system upon all its citizens. Within the legacy of AngloAmerican natural law-based legal traditions, the right of meaningful access
is a fundamental incident of citizenship. This right is individually
enforceable and is grounded in those constitutional provisions which require
open courts, which mandate recurrent resort to fundamental principles, and
which prohibit conferring special privileges. It dictates the appointment of
counsel at public expense in those cases where such is necessary to allow an
indigent litigant to appear and effectively participate in a proceeding in a
manner that will allow the court to carry out its adjudicative function to the
end that justice is done.
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Or, in the language of Justice Finley in Carter I, 536 P.2d at 620-621, “effective
access.”
40
Cf. Iverson, 517 P.2d 197. Under Washington Constitution article VI, section 1 and
section 30, it is the duty of the judiciary to ensure “the fair and impartial administration
of justice and the duty to see that justice is done in the cases that come before the court.”
Id.
41
Most of these state constitutional provisions predate the Oregon and Indiana
constitutions from which Washington’s open courts provision originated. See, e.g.,WIS.
CONST. art. I, § sec. 9 (“Remedy for wrongs. SECTION 9. Every person is entitled to a
certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person,
property, or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to
purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to
the laws.”) MINN. CONST. art. I, § sec. 8 (“REDRESS OF INJURIES OR WRONGS).
35
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Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which
he may receive to his person, property, or character, and to obtain justice freely and
without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay,
conformable to the laws.”); OHIO CONST. §sec. 1.16 (“All courts shall be open, and every
person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or
delay.”); KY. CONST. §sec. 14 (“All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial, or delay”).
42
WASH. CONST. art. 1 § 10.
43
Id. The language of article I, section 10 is more succinct than that included in the draft
Constitution of 1878. The language in the 1878 Constitution more closely tracked the
more expansive language embodied in other state constitutions. Article V, sec. I, sec. 9
of that Constitution provided that:
[e]very person in the State shall be entitled to a certain remedy in the law, for
all wrongs and injuries which he may receive in his person, character or
property; justice shall be administered to all freely and without purchase;
completely and without denial; promptly and without delay; and all courts
shall be open to the public.
Compare OR. CONST. art. I, § sec. 10, (stating that “[n]o court shall be secret, but justice
shall be administered, openly and without purchase, completely and without delay, and
every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person,
property, or reputation.”). While employing different language, there is nothing in the
constitutional deliberations of the 1889 convention (see generally, THE JOURNAL OF THE
WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889 (Beverly Paulik Rosenow
ed., 1999) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF CONVENTION]) to suggest that the drafters intended
to deviate in either purpose or substance from the right expressed in the earlier
constitutional endeavor or that which was embodied in the constitutions of Washington’s
sister states. See generally, THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889 (Beverly Paulik Rosenow ed., 1999) [hereinafter
JOURNAL OF CONVENTION]. The provision is clearly intended to carry forward the two
great promises of Anglo-American tradition—(1) full access to the courts by all citizens
“without purchase” (in the language of the Magna Carta, the 1878 draft, and the Hill
draft), so that all may effectively assert and defend personal rights and secure timely
access to a remedy at law, (see King v. Olympic Pipeline Co., 16 P.3d 45, 57-58 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2000); and (2) maintenance of a justice system that is open and subject to public
scrutiny, and freedom from star chamber-like proceedings or other secret trials.
44
See Bullock v. Roberts, 524 P.2d 385 (Wash. 1974) (access to the courts in a
dissolution action is a fundamental right); Whitney v. Buckner, 734 P.2d 485, 488-489
(Wash. 1987) (absent a countervailing state interest, even prisoners, who have lost many
civil rights upon conviction and incarceration, must be “afforded meaningful access to
the courts”). Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center, 819 P.2d 370 (Wash. 1991); King, 16
P.3d at 57-58; State v. Dorsey, 914 P.2d 773, 776-77 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (persons
required to settle disputes through the judicial process must be afforded “meaningful
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access” to the courts). The decisions in Whitney and Dorsey were not grounded in the
article. I, sec. 10, but in traditional notions of due process. Nevertheless, they affirm that
a right of meaningful access to the courts exists in Washington State.
45
In exchange for the grant of governing powers to the state—including the power to
establish and maintain a system of justice—the citizen reserves such rights and liberties
that have not been conceded, as well as the right of access to the system of justice for the
effective assertion and defense of such rights and liberties. Richard Sanders & Barbara
Mahoney, Restoration of Limited State Constitutional Government: A Dissenter’s View,
59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 269 (2003).
46
Iverson, 517 P.2d at 199 (saying “Const. art. IV, s. 1 and s. 30, vests the judicial power
in the supreme court, court of appeals, and superior courts of this state. Upon creation,
these courts assumed certain powers and duties. [citations omitted]. These duties include,
among others, the fair and impartial administration of justice and the duty to see that
justice is done in the cases that come before the court”)
47
See Justice Finley’s observations in Carter I., 536 P.2d at 620-21.
48
Iverson, 517 P.2d at 199.
49
See discussion and text, supra notes 12-17.
50
Carter I, 536 P.2d at 625.
51
Housing Authority, 557 P.2d at 327 (observing that “[a]ccess to the courts is amply
and expressly protected by other provisions”).
52
Carter I, 536 P.2d. Accord Ford Motor Co. v. Barrett, 800 P.2d at 367 (Wash. 1990).
53
Doe, 819 P.2d (though no source of the right itself is disclosed).
54
See Miranda, 991 P.2d at 687 (“[T]he right of access to the courts is fundamental to
our system of justice. Indeed, it is the right “conservative of all other rights.” [citation
omitted] . “ . . . [M]eaningful access requires representation. Where rights and
responsibilities are adjudicated in the absence of representation, the results are often
unjust. If representation is absent because of a litigant’s poverty, then likely so is justice,
and for the same reason.”).
55
That the provisions of the Constitution were intended, through the operation of
Washington Constitution article. CONST. art. I, section 29 to be individually enforceable,
was confirmed by Convention Delegate (and later Supreme Court Justice) Theodore
Stiles. Writing nearly twenty-five years after the 1889 convention, Stiles observed:
There have been some excellent provisions in the constitution from which the
people have had no benefit, because they depend for operation upon action by
the legislature, and that body has neglected to do its duty in the premises.
Considering that by section 29 of the first article every direction contained in
the constitution is mandatory unless expressly declared to be otherwise, it is at
least surprising that in some instances no attempt has been made whatever to
set these provisions at their legitimate work.
Theodore L. Stiles, Effects of State Constitution on Public Interests, WASHINGTON
HISTORICAL QUARTERLY, Vol. IV, No. 4 WASH. HIST. Q. 281, 286 (1913).
56
WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 32.
57
See JOURNAL OF CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 516-17 (Beverly Paulik Rosenow ed.
1999). These referenced provisions were not unique to Wisconsin, Illinois or New
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Hampshire. They incorporate and carry forward an uninterrupted history of state
constitutions expressly recognizing fundamental principles as tools for constitutional
interpretation as society evolves. See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XIV (asserting
“[t]hat a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice,
moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality are absolutely necessary to preserve the
blessings of liberty, and keep a government free: the people ought therefore to pay
particular attention to these points in the choice of officers and representatives, and have
a right to exact a due and constant regard to them, from their legislatures and magistrates,
in the making and executing such laws as are necessary for the good government of the
state.”) (emphasis supplied); VA. CONST. of 1776, § 15 (asserting “[t]hat no free
government, or the blessings of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by a firm
adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue, and by frequent
recurrence to fundamental principles.”) (emphasis supplied).
58
For further discussion on this point, see Perluss, supra note 1312, at 584. See also
State v. Seeley, 940 P.2d 604, 621 (Wash. 1997) (noting that art. I, sec. 32 is most often
employed by the courts as an “interpretive mechanism” to determine the substance and
scope of individual rights that find their origins under natural rights theory); Brian Snure,
Comment, A Frequent Recurrence to Fundamental Principles: Individual Rights, Free
Government, and the Washington State Constitution, 67 WASH. L. REV. 669, 676 (1992).
59
This discussion does not look to (nor is it bound by) precedent interpreting the due
process, equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses of the federal constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment. Washington State stands in relation to the federal
government as a co-equal grantor of powers. In this sense, it predates the federal
constitution and is host to the first line of delegated sovereignty and constitutional
inquiry. Given the hierarchy of sovereignty relationships and conferrals of authority in
our federal system (i.e., the people grant limited sovereignty to the state, which in turn
grants an even more limited scope of authority to the federal government), independent
analysis of state declarations of rights is, and must be, the first order of constitutional
inquiry. See State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986); See also State v. Smith, 814
P.2d 652, 662 (Wash. 1991) (Utter, J. concurring) (stating “[s]tate constitutions were
originally intended to be the primary devices to protect individual rights, with the federal
constitution a secondary layer of protection. Accordingly they were intended to provide
broader protection [than their federal counterpart].”). The purpose of the state
constitution—including that portion of the constitution that articulates and affirms
fundamental individual rights and imposes limitations on the government that is being
created —is different from that of its federal counterpart. There being no federal
counterpart to Washington Constitution article. Const. art. I, sec. 10, Gunwall and its
progeny make clear that an independent analysis of the state constitutional provision is
indicated.
60
As Justice Sutherland explained in the context of the right to counsel in criminal cases:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If
charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
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whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he has a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be
true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and
illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or
federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by
and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal
would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the
constitutional sense.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
61
Compare WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 (referencing an individual’s right to appear by
counsel in criminal cases).
62
Although, such a right has long existed in English statutory law. See 11 Hen. 7, ch. 12
(1495), reprinted in 2 STAT. OF THE REALM 578 (1969). In recent years, the right has
been effectuated through the English legal aid system. See Perluss, supra note 13, at 58687.
63
Iverson, 517 P.2d at 199.
64
Carter I, 536 P.2d at 620.
65
See WASH. REV. CODE § 12.40.010 (2005).
66
WASH. REV. CODE § 12.40.080 (2005) reads:
Hearing. (1) No attorney at law, legal paraprofessional, nor any person other
than the plaintiff and defendant, shall appear or participate with the
prosecution or defense of litigation in the small claims department without the
consent of the judicial officer hearing the case. A corporation may not be
represented by an attorney at law or legal paraprofessional except as set forth
REV.
CODE
§
12.40.025.
in
WASH.
(2) In the small claims department it shall not be necessary to summon
witnesses, but the plaintiff and defendant in any claim shall have the privilege
of offering evidence in their behalf by witnesses appearing at trial.
(3) The judge may informally consult witnesses or otherwise investigate the
controversy between the parties and give judgment or make such orders as the
judge may deem to be right, just, and equitable for the disposition of the
controversy.
67

The right attaches in favor of those who meet the standard of indigency applicable to
proceeding in forma pauperis.
68
If private counsel is available, no right to counsel at public expense would attach.
69
See Major Prods. Co., 979 P.2d at 907-8 (appointing the University of Washington
Legal Clinic to assist the unrepresented respondents).
70
WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
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71

See generally WASH. ST. CT. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (CJC), Cannon 3(A).
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.006 (2005) (mandatory use of approved forms);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.181 (2005) (procedure for establishing a parenting plan).
73
Acting pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 26.12.240, most counties have hired full or
part time courthouse-based family law facilitators who provide basic information and
services to pro se family law litigants. Activities of courthouse facilitators are governed
by WASH. ST. CT. GENERAL R. 27, available at http://www.courts.was.gov/court_rules
(last visited Dec. 2, 2005). They may not provide individualized legal advice or
assistance.
74
Scores of self-help information packets are available on the statewide Washington
Law Help website maintained by the Northwest Justice Project are available at
www.washingtonlawhelp.org.
75
The proliferation of self-help materials contributes to a false sense that low-income
people can represent themselves competently in complex, contested family law matters.
As one superior court judge recently explained:
72

When designing a delivery system, we need to continue to remind ourselves,
and the low- and moderate-income litigants, that they cannot represent
themselves effectively. What with all the mandatory and other forms,
facilitators and the like, the implicit message to folks is not only can they
represent themselves but they can do it effectively. Allowing that implicit
message to continue misrepresents how the system works to low- and
moderate-income people. Self-representation may be the only option for low/moderate-income people, but we still owe them a duty to be honest about the
process.
CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, supra note 8, at 82.
76
Comprehensive substantive and procedural laws governing dissolution, parenting
plans / child residential placement / basis for limitations, property disposition, child
support, etc. are codified in Washington statute. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.
77
The state must appoint counsel for parents in state-initiated dependency proceedings.
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.090(2) (2005). Civil proceedings under Title 26.09 do not
currently require the appointment of counsel for unrepresented parents.
78
Regarding a parent’s constitutionally protected substantive due process-based liberty
interests regarding child rearing decisions, see In re the Parentage of: C.A.M.A, 109 P.3d
405, 408 (Wash. 2005); In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 27 (Wash. 1998); Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000).
79
WASH. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.5(d)(1).
80
NORTHWEST JUSTICE PROJECT, FOURTH QUARTER 2004 ADVOCACY REPORT 14
(2004). Northwest Justice Project (NJP) is the principal statewide legal aid provider in
Washington State. Review of this report provides additional insight into a broad
spectrum of civil cases where counsel must be required in order for individuals to secure
meaningful access to the courts.
81
Housing related legal problems represent one-sixth of all issues reported in the Civil
Legal Needs Study. See CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, supra note 8, at 34.
82
WASH. REV. CODE § 59.12.050 (2005).
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83

WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.290 (2005).
Munden v. Hazelrigg, 711 P.2d 295, 298 (Wash. 1985).
85
The procedure is outlined in the state statute. WASH. REV. CODE § 59.12.010-030
(2005); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 59.18.365-410 (2005).
86
§§ 59.18.365-410.
87
Id.
88
E.g., Washington’s Law Against Discrimination, WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010
(2005); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 3601 et seq.; Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. § 12101.
89
See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.580 (2005) (prohibiting actions to terminate a tenancy
on the basis of a tenant’s status as a victim of domestic violence), which statute
ultimately served as the basis for the court’s dismissal of the landlord’s claim with
prejudice.
90
Factually, the rent had been paid. Legally, provisions in the Residential Landlord
Tenant Act protect residents from eviction due to the tenant’s status as a victim of
domestic violence or sexual assault. § 59.18.580.
91
MAGNA CARTA art. 40.
92
See, e.g., MD. CONST. 1776, art. XVII, XVIII (1776).
XVII. That every freeman, for any injury done him in his person or property, ought to
have remedy, by the course of the law of the land, and ought to have justice and right
freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the
law of the land.
XVIII. That the trial of facts where they arise, is one of the greatest securities of the lives,
liberties and estates of the people.
See also THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE PROVINCE OF EAST NEW JERSEY
IN AMERICA (1689), art. XIX:
84

That no person or persons within the said Province shall be taken and
imprisoned, or be devised of his freehold, free custom or liberty, or be
outlawed or exiled, or any other way destroyed; nor shall they be condemned
or judgment pass’d upon them, but by lawful judgment of their peers: neither
shall justice nor right be bought or sold, deferred or delayed, to any person
whatsoever: … And in all courts persons of all persuasions may freely appear
in their own way, and according to their own manner, and there personally
plead their own causes themselves, or if unable, by their friends, no person
being allowed to take money for pleading or advice in such cases . . .
See also N.C. CONST. 1776, art. XIV (1776) (stating “[t]hat in all controversies at law,
respecting property, the ancient mode of trial, by jury, is one of the best securities of the
rights of the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable”).
93
This discussion incorporates the earlier discussion of what is meant by “meaningful
access.” As employed in the analysis of Washington Constitution article. CONST. art. I,
sec. 10, “meaningful access” is “the capacity to appear and effectively participate in
proceedings properly presented to the court in a manner that will allow the court to
operate properly carry out its adjudicative function to the end that justice can be done.”
94
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12.
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95

Id.
See State v. Manussier, 921 P.2d 473, 482 (Wash. 1996) (stating that “[t]his court has
consistently construed the federal and state equal protection clauses identically and
considered claims arising under their scope as one issue.”). See also Grant County Fire
Protection Dist. No. 5 v. Moses Lake, 83 P.3d 419, 425 (Wash. 2004) [hereinafter Grant
County II] (explaining that because of the unique development (or lack thereof) of federal
case law since the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), the state privileges and
immunities clause, art. 1, sec. 12, has been compared with the federal equal protection
clause rather than its more logical counterpart, the federal privileges and immunities
clause, U.S. CONST., art. IV, § sec. 2).
97
The criticism and encouragement had come from members of the court itself (e.g.,
State v Smith, 814 P.2d at 662, and from commentators. See, e.g., David Schuman, The
Right to “Equal Privileges and Immunities”: A State’s Version of “Equal Protection,” 13
VT. L. REV. 221, 221 (1988); Jonathan Thompson, The Washington Constitution’s
Prohibition on Special Privileges and Immunities: Real Bite for “Equal Protection”
Review of Regulatory Legislation?, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1247, 1251 (1996); Jeffrey M.
Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L .J. 1013,
1043 (2003); Barbara Mahoney, The Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in
the Washington State Constitution (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author
and referenced in Justice Sanders’ dissent in Grant County Fire Protection Dist. No. 5 v.
Moses Lake, 42 P.3d 394, 416 (Wash. 2002)) [hereinafter Grant County I].
98
Rosenow observes that art. I, sec. 12 was borrowed from the Oregon, Hill draft
(borrowed from California) and Indiana constitutions. JOURNAL OF CONVENTION, supra
note 43, at 501 n. 1. In recent years both the Oregon and Indiana Supreme Courts have
deviated from the traditional conclusion that the rights protected by these state privileges
and immunities clauses were coextensive with those protected under federal equal
protection analysis, and have developed an independent state constitutional framework
for considering claims that legislative classifications confer special privileges or
immunities in violation of these provisions. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 630 P.2d 810, 814815 (Or. 1981) (noting that the state privileges and immunities clause “forbids inequality
of privileges or immunities not available ‘upon the same terms,’ first, to any citizen, and
second, to any class of citizens.”); Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 77 (Ind. 1994)
(reasoning that the Indiana privileges and immunities clause intended to preclude the
legislature from conferring affirmative and special privileges to some citizens, but was
not intended to be an assurance of equal protections of the laws). Unfortunately, the
jurisprudence that has developed in each of these states turns out to be more in the nature
of a highly deferential equal-protection analysis than an independent assessment of the
constitutionality of state conduct that interferes with “fundamental rights that are
incidents of state citizenship.” See, e.g., In Re Marriage of Crocker, 22 P.3d 759, 766
(Or. 2001); Humphreys v. Clinic for Women,,796 N.E.2d 247, 253 (Ind. 2003); Morrison
v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). See also, Jon Laramore, Indiana
Constitutional Developments: The Wind Shifts, 36 IND. L. REV. 961, 964 n.29 (2003).
99
Grant County II, 83 P.3d 419.
100
Id. The scope of individual protections and the corresponding limitations on
governmental conduct established by the privileges and immunities clause are likely to be
96
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addressed in greater detail when the Washington Supreme Court issues its opinion in
Andersen v. King County, No. 3-75934-1 (argued Mar. 8, 2005).
101
The special privileges and immunities inquiry is independent of the equal protection
inquiry conducted under the same section, jurisprudential authority for which did not
appear to be affected by the Grant County II decision.
102
Grant County II, 83 P.3d at 428.
103
State v. Vance, 70 P. 34, 41 (Wash. 1902).
104
Id. (citing THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATE OF THE AMERICAN UNION
597 (1868)).
105
Id.; See also The Slaughter-House Cases , 83 U.S. 36, 37 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting), citing the famous observation of Justice Bushrod Washington in Corfield v.
Coryell, to the effect that that the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several
states (as opposed to citizens of the United States) at the time of the ratification of the
federal constitution included, among the many rights that would be “more tedious than
difficult to enumerate,” is the right “to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the
courts of the state.”).
106
See Grant County II, 83 P.3d at 426 (citing Thompson, supra note 97, at 1253). See
also Hale v. Port of Portland, 783 P.2d 506, 515 (Or. 1989) (noting that “[t]he original
target of this constitutional prohibition was the abuse of governmental authority to
provide special privileges or immunities for favored individuals or classes, not
discrimination against disfavored ones.”).
107
Grant County II involved a statutory scheme granting annexation petition rights to
some but not others.
108
Washington Constitution article. CONST. art. IV, section, § 1 is a grant of authority to
the judiciary to establish and maintain a system for the fair, proper, and equitable
administration of justice.
109
In this case, the class includes those who need the assistance of legal counsel to
meaningfully participate in court proceedings, but who cannot afford to do so and, as a
consequence, are effectively denied the ability to assert, enforce, or defend their legal
rights in said court proceedings.
110
For example, the fundamental right of meaningful access.
111
Those who have the ability to retain legal counsel and meaningfully participate in the
judicial forum.
112
Iverson, 517 P.2d at 199.
113
WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
114
MAGNA CARTA, art. 40.
115
The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamiliton, FEDERALIST NO. 78, THE JUDICIARY
(McLean’s ed., May 28, 1788).
116
Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6,
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6, para. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 228 (emphasis supplied).
117
Compare this language with Washington Constitution article. CONST. art. 1, sec. § 10,
which states that “[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without
unnecessary delay.”
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118

Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 305 (1979), available at,
http://www.worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1979/3.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
119
Id.
120
Id. at ¶ 24.
121
Id. at ¶ 26.
122
Id. at ¶ 26, 28.
123
Steel & Morris v. U.K., 41X Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 22, (2005), available at,
http://www.worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2005/103.html.
124
Id. at ¶ 12.
125
Under England’s Legal Aid Act of 1988, libel actions were categorically excluded
from those cases for which legal counsel would be provided. Id. at para. 41.
126
Id. at ¶ 35.
127
Id. at ¶ 72.
128
Id. at ¶ 59.
129
Id. at ¶ 60-61.
130
Id. at ¶ 62.
131
Id. at ¶ 63.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. at ¶ 64, 66.
135
Id. at ¶ 67.
136
See id. at ¶ 72.
137
Id.
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